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Purdue University  University of Newcastle   Purdue University 






Case histories have played an important role in guiding development of geotechnical engineering during a time when theory was not 
sophisticated enough to model even simple problems with an acceptable level of rigor. As the discipline transitions from 
overwhelming reliance on empiricism to a greater reliance on science, it is useful to reexamine the best known case histories as a 
general check on modern methods of analysis. In the engineering of foundations in clay, three case histories  the collapses of the 
Transcona and Fargo grain elevators and the near collapse of the leaning tower of Pisa  stand out. We will see that limit analysis, 
which is a method of analysis based on two theorems from plasticity theory that allow bounding the collapse load from above and 
below, produces collapse load estimates that match closely the estimated collapse loads for the two failed grain elevators. It does so 
without giving the analyst much latitude in selection of input parameters, not requiring the elaborate assumptions needed when 
attempts are made to use an excessively simplified theory to analyze a real problem. We will also show, using the problem of a 
leaning tower, how resort to a complete analysis of a boundary-value problem, using a method like the finite element method, is 
sometimes required in determining the critical ultimate limit state. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION                                                                                          
 
Proper design of foundations requires a strong basis on 
mechanics but should also be corroborated by the satisfactory 
performance of foundations.  Well documented case histories 
are useful in such corroboration.  Experiments also allow us to 
compare predicted and measured foundation response; 
however, experiments are often restricted to model tests or to 
single-element tests (such as the load test of a pile).  In 
contrast, case histories that are sufficiently rich in details 
allow comparisons with simulations of entire foundation-
structure systems, adding a measure of realism to the 
validation of analyses and design methods. 
 
Not every case history needs to be a complete account of 
successful or unsuccessful design and construction of a 
structure. Unfortunately, real structures are rarely 
instrumented and soil profile characterization is rarely done so 
completely that a traditional case history can be useful to a 
complete validation of a theoretical analysis.  While a 
traditional case history informs, may reveal serious missteps 
or, more rarely, may reveal a limit state that is surprising and 
not typically considered in design, it rarely serves as 
validation of a theoretical method of analysis.  
In this paper, we focus on the combination of case histories 
with science-based methods of analysis as a powerful way of 
advancing methods of design. We will explore two cases of 
bearing capacity failure (the collapse of grain elevators in 
Transcona and Fargo), discuss an alternative collapse limit 
state (leaning stability) that threatened the Tower of Pisa. To 
all cases, we apply modern methods of analysis. 
 
By selecting case histories of historical relevance to 
geotechnical engineering, we illustrate how our progress in 
developing predictive methods based on the mechanics of 
soils and structures can be tested by analysis of case histories.  
We conclude the paper by laying out some principles 
regarding both the planning of detailed field experiments and 









It has been roughly sixty years since Drucker, Greenberg and 
Prager (1951) published their ground-breaking lower and 
upper bound theorems of plasticity theory, on which limit 
analysis is based. Limit analysis always had the potential to 
produce excellent solutions to collapse problems, typified in 
soil mechanics by the bearing capacity problem.  However, the 
numerical techniques required for finding very close lower 
and upper bounds on collapse loads, thus closely defining the 
collapse loads, were not available until very recently. 
 
Limit analysis takes advantage of the lower and upper bound 
theorems of plasticity theory to bound the rigorous solution to 
a stability problem from below and above.  The lower bound 
theorem states that collapse does not occur for a statically 
admissible stress field - a stress field that is stable (i.e., does 
not violate the yield criterion at any point) and statically 
admissible (i.e., is in equilibrium with the surface traction and 
body forces). This can be written in the form of the virtual 
work equation as: 
 
L L L
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T v dS X v dV dV D( )dV dV               (1) 
 
where L
ij = statically admissible stress field in equilibrium 
with the tractions L
iT  and the body forces 
L
iX ; ij = actual 
stress field; 
ij = actual strain rate field; vi = actual velocity 
field; and D(
ij ) is the plastic dissipation associated with the 
strain rate field 
ij .  It should be noted that, in the lower 
bound theorem, only the equilibrium condition and the stress 
boundary conditions are satisfied.  No kinematics is taken into 
account. 
 
The upper bound theorem states that collapse is either 
imminent or already underway for a kinematically admissible 
velocity (or strain rate) field – a velocity field which is both 
unstable [i.e., the rate of external work calculated from the 
velocity (or strain rate) field exceeds or equals the internal 
power dissipation)] and kinematically admissible (i.e., the 
velocity field satisfies the velocities specified at the boundary 
of the soil mass). This can be written as follows: 
 
U U U U U U U U
i i i i ij ij ij ij ij
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T v dS X v dV dV D( )dV dV                (2) 
 
where U
iv = kinematically admissible velocity field compatible 
with the strain rate field U
ij ; 
U
ij = stress field in equilibrium 
with the upper bound loading U
iT  and 
U
iX ; ij = actual stress 
field; and D( U
ij ) is the plastic dissipation associated with the 
strain rate field U
ij . The upper bound theorem satisfies the 
flow rule, the compatibility condition and the velocity 
boundary conditions, but not the equilibrium condition or 
traction boundary conditions. In (1) and (2), the inequalities 
are due to the principle of maximum power dissipation. The 
stress fields in (1) and (2) are in terms of effective stresses 
since power is dissipated only through the soil skeleton. 
 
Finite element limit analysis combines the limit theorems with 
finite elements to produce a discrete mathematical 
programming problem. The numerical formulations used in 
this investigation originate from those developed by Sloan 
(1988, 1989), but has evolved significantly over the past two 
decades to incorporate the major improvements described in 
Lyamin and Sloan (2002a, 2002b) and Krabbenhoft et al. 
(2005, 2007). In brief, these formulations use linear stress 
(lower bound) and linear velocity (upper bound) triangular 
finite elements to discretize the soil mass. In contrast to 
conventional displacement finite element analysis, each node 
in limit analysis mesh is unique to a particular element so that 
statically admissible stress (in the lower bound case) and 
kinematically admissible velocity discontinuities (in the upper 
bound case) are possible along shared edges between two 
adjacent elements. Both formulations result in convex 
mathematical programs, which (considering the dual form of 












   (3) 
 
where λ is a load multiplier,  is a vector of stress variables, A 
is a matrix of equality constraint coefficients, p0 and p are 
vectors of prescribed and optimizable forces, fi is the yield 
function for stress set i, and N is the number of stress nodes. 
The solutions to problem (1) can be found efficiently by using 
general Interior-Point methods (IPM) or specialised conic 
optimization solvers (SOCP). 
 
The end product of the optimization problem is the stress field 
leading to the maximum lower bound to the collapse load and 
the velocity (displacement) field consistent with the lowest 
upper bound to the collapse load achievable with the finite 
element mesh used in the analysis. If these two bounds are 
close enough, the collapse load is rather precisely known. As 
we will see, that is always the case with 2D computations. In 
3D computations, it is known that the lower bound is closer to 
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CASE HISTORY Ⅰ: TRANSCONA GRAIN ELEVATOR 
FAILURE, 1913 
 
The Structure, the Failure and the Soil Profile 
 
The Canadian Pacific Railway Company started construction 
of the Transcona Grain Elevator in 1911 in North Transcona, 7 
miles northeast of Winnipeg, Canada, and roughly 230 miles 
north of Fargo, North Dakota. Construction ended in 
September 1913. The elevator was composed of a reinforced 
concrete work house and a bin house, which were connected 
by a bridge and conveyor belt. The conveyor belt operated in a 
low cupola at the top of the bin-house. The work house was 
21.3 m wide, 29.3 m long and 54.9 m tall and rested on a raft 
foundation with base located 3.66 m below the ground surface. 
The bin house had five rows of 13 bins and was constructed 
on a reinforced-concrete raft foundation that was 23.5 m wide 
and 59.4 m long and had the base placed also at a depth of 
3.66 m. The thickness of this mat foundation was 0.6 m. The 
bins were 28.0 m in height and 4.27 m in diameter. Fig. 1 








Fig. 1 The Transcona grain elevator: (a) the elevator 
foundation plan and (b) the structure before collapse (after 
White, 1953). Used with permission from ICE Publishing. 
Before construction of the grain elevator, the only test known 
to have been performed was a plate load test at the design 
depth of the foundation. The bearing soil was deemed similar 
to soil found in the Winnipeg area, on which tall structures 
had been erected. The notion that the depth of influence of a 
plate load test is tied to the size of the plate may not have been 
well understood at the time; as a result, the effect of a weaker 
clay layer located below the shallower, relatively stiff clay 
layer on which the plate load test was performed was not 
contemplated. 
 
After construction, operations started; the amount of grains 
was approximately evenly distributed between the bins. On 
October 18, 1913, settlement of the bin house was first 
observed (Allaire, 1916). There were 875,000 bushels of 
wheat in the elevator at that moment, corresponding to a load 
of 231,400 kN. If we combine these 231,400 kN with the dead 
weight of the structure, a total load of 409,400 kN was applied 
at the base of the raft. Considering these loads to have been 
distributed uniformly over the raft foundation, the applied load 
on the mat foundation could be estimated as 293 kPa. 
 
As soon as settlement started, it increased steadily, but slowly, 
to about 0.30 m within an hour. After that, the structure tilted 
toward the west during the next 24 hours until its lean was 26 
degrees, 53 minutes from the vertical. A 7.5-9.0 m wide strip 
of ground on the east side of the bin-house bulged up about 
1.2-1.5 m (except on the south side, where the work house was 
located), while the west side settled as much as 9 m below its 
original level (Fig. 2). As the photos in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 attest, 
all of this happened slowly enough that White (1953) could 
take photographs during the event and have an accurate 





Fig. 2 The collapse of the Transcona Grain Elevator (White, 
1953). Used with permission from ICE Publishing. 
 
 
After the failure, several wash borings were made near the site 
that showed that rather uniform deposits of clay existed 
beneath the bin house and elevator. In 1951, there were 
additional borings performed near the work house. As a result, 
it was found that the ground was mainly composed of two 
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thick clay layers. The unit weights of these layers were taken 
as 18.8 kN/m
3
 by Peck and Bryant (1953). The ground water 
level was located at a depth of 2.56m in boring No. 1. By 
testing undisturbed samples from different depths, the 
unconfined compressive strength, natural water content and 
liquid and plastic limits were obtained for different layers and 
are shown in Table 1. Using half of the unconfined 
compressive strength values obtained, the undrained shear 
strength profile with depth could be estimated as shown in Fig. 
3 . The locations of borings No. 1 and No. 2 are shown in Fig. 
1(a). The lines in Fig. 3 represent the shear strength profile 
used in the analysis of this failure, discussed next. 
 
The undrained shear strength su was assumed constant with 
depth within each of the layers identified in Fig. 3; the vertical 
lines in this figure represent the values of su assumed in the 
analysis for each layer, which are given numerically in Table 2. 
The layer of fractured limestone was treated as a frictional 
material. A high friction angle, of as much as 50 degrees, 
would likely be appropriate for the fractured limestone. 
Analyses show, however, that even a layer with friction angle 
as low as fifteen degrees would deflect the slip mechanism up 
into the overlying clay, so characterization of the fractured 
limestone turns out not to be critical to the results of the 
analysis (and the friction angle is noted as greater than 15 




Fig. 3 Undrained shear strength with depth (based on borings 
No. 1 and No. 2). 
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Table 2 The value of undrained shear strength for each soil 




Depth (m) Undrained shear strength (kPa) 
1 0-2 55.5 
2 9.1-12.6 32.6 
3 12.6-15.2 20.3 
4 15.2-16.5 Treated as frictional 
 
Reassessment of the Case History using Modern Methods 
 
We will start by analyzing the Transcona elevator collapse 
using 2D limit analysis. 2D analysis would be suitable for a 
plane-strain problem (one in which the shear strain 
components in one plane and the strain component normal to 
that plane are all zero). Assumption of plane strain is a 
frequent assumption in soil mechanics, even when it does not 
strictly apply. Every problem is in fact three-dimensional; the 
cross section of the problem in this case refers to the cross 
section corresponding to the smaller plan dimension (the 
width B of the foundation). Fig. 4 shows the finite element 
mesh used for the 2D limit analyses. Fig. 5 shows the same 
mesh distorted after collapse (in truth, an image based on the 
velocities at failure and thus on the last displacement 
increments), and Fig. 6 shows the plastic energy dissipation as 
a result of the collapse. Both the distorted mesh and the plot of 
energy dissipation show where shearing localized at collapse. 
The distorted mesh does not represent accumulated 
displacement but rather results from scaling up the 
incremental displacements at collapse, giving a qualitative 
view of slip pattern at collapse. The lower bound on the unit 
limit load was 284 and the upper bound was 296 kPa. Since 
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the estimated unit load at the time of collapse is 293 kPa, there 
appears to be a good match; however, neither our estimates of 
shear strength nor the estimate of load at the time of collapse 
is free of error. Additionally, the foundation is not long 
enough with respect to its width for the problem to 
approximate a plane-strain problem. Accordingly, we also 

























































Fig. 6 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the two-
dimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Transcona elevator 
failure. 
 
The mesh for the 3D analysis is shown in Fig. 7, the distorted 
mesh in Fig. 8, and the power dissipation plot in Fig. 9. The 
resulting lower and upper bounds on limit unit bearing 
capacity are 310 and 376 kPa. The larger difference between 
the bounds compared with that for the 2D analysis reflects the 
greater challenges of a 3D analysis. Comparisons of 3D finite 
element limit analysis with the solutions of problems that can 
be solved exactly (such as by Salgado et al. 2004 and Lyamin 
et al. 2007) show that the lower bound is significantly closer 
to the collapse load, so that we can expect the collapse load, as 
calculated using 3D FELA to be of the order of 320-330 kPa, 





































Fig. 9 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the three-
dimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Transcona elevator 
failure. 
 
The advantage of using an analysis that is rigorous and 
requires no assumption to make it applicable to the problem at 
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hand is that the only judgment that is required regards the 
values of shear strength to use in the analysis. The geometry is 
set and is easily input into the analysis. The estimated collapse 
load based on the amount of grain believed to be in the 
elevators at the time of collapse is subject to some uncertainty, 
so the difference of the order of 10% between calculated and 
observed bearing capacity is quite satisfactory. To put this 
comparison in perspective, Peck and Bryant (1953) used the 
bearing capacity equation proposed by Skempton (1951) 
which already contained early forms of shape and depth 






n bL c u u
B D
q q N c c
L B
  
      
  
             (4) 
 
In order to use this equation, they needed to estimate a value 
of shear strength that would represent the entire soil mass, 
since it does not allow for layered soil, which of course 
requires considerable judgment. Peck and Bryant (1953) used 
two values of shear strength: a weighted average value of the 
undrained shear strength over the total thickness of the clay 
layers and the smallest shear strength for all layers. The effect 
of the strength of fractured limestone was neglected. A 
bearing capacity of 314 kPa, which is 7.2% greater than the 
observed unit load at collapse, was calculated using the 
average shear strength. Use of the smallest undrained shear 
strength produced a value of 240 kPa, which is 18% lower 
than the collapse unit load. 
 
Since the variation of shear strength with depth affects the 
depth and shape of the slip mechanism in a way that cannot be 
foreseen without a suitable method of analysis (Salgado 2008), 
this is typically a difficult estimate to make based on judgment 
and without the aid of a more sophisticated method of analysis. 
Another element of uncertainty regarding the shear strength is 
that, based on the tests on samples from a limited number of 
borings, we established a depth profile of shear strength and 
assumed no variation of it in the horizontal direction. Lastly, 
given the composition of the clay at the site, with a 
nonnegligible percentage of montmorillonite, for example, its 
residual friction angle should be lower than its critical-state 
friction angle, which would suggest that some degree of 
progressive failure might have played a small role in the 
failure. This would be consistent with our collapse load 
estimated being slightly greater than the load believed to have 
been applied to the foundations at the time of collapse. 
 
 
CASE HISTORY II: FARGO GRAIN ELEVATOR, 1955 
 
The Structure, the Failure and the Soil Profile 
 
The Fargo grain elevator was a reinforced concrete grain 
elevator built during the summer and fall of 1954 about two 
miles west of Fargo, North Dakota (located in roughly the 
same geologic setting and 230 miles south of Transcona). It 
consisted of 20 circular bins that were arranged in two rows of 
10 bins each and attached structures (Fig. 10(a) and (b)). The 
height and inside diameter of the bins were 37.2 m and 5.8 m. 
This structure rested on a reinforced concrete raft foundation 
that was 15.8 m wide, 66.4 m long and 0.71m thick. The outer 
0.91 m edge around the structure was thickened to 1.32m. 
Except for this thickened edge, the base of the foundation was 
located 1.83 m below the ground surface. The raft foundation 
was interrupted locally by tunnels. There were also sheet piles 
that had been installed around the foundation; they should 
have had negligible effect on the performance of the raft. 
 
Until fall of 1954, only a small amount of grain had been 
stored in the elevator. The first time the elevator was filled 
with a large quantity of grain was April, 1955. Filling started 
then, and, in the early morning of June 12, 1955, the elevator 
collapsed and disintegrated. On May 10, 1955, after major 
filling had started, seven elevation benchmarks were installed, 
and the settlements of the foundation were recorded together 
with applied loads once a week after that. Fig. 11 shows the 
resulting load-settlement curve. The collapse happened when 
the unit load at failure was estimated at 260 kPa, with an 
estimated eccentricity of 0.96 m west and 0.03 m south from 
the centroid of the raft. Subtracting the weight of the 1.8m of 
soil excavated from the site, the net unit load at the time of 
failure was approximately 228 kPa. Failure produced a mass 
of concrete debris and grain on the north side of the original 
location of the structure. The ground bulged up as much as 
1.83 m on the south side of the structure. 
 
After collapse, three borings were performed at the site: 
boring No. 1 and 3 in zones largeky unaffected by the collapse 
and boring No. 2 in a zone disturbed by the collapse (Fig. 10 
(b) shows the locations of the three borings). They revealed 
that the soil profile below the structure had three clay layers 
and one thin sand layer. 
 
The undrained shear strength depth profile in the clay layers 
was estimated from the results of the field vane tests. In 
arriving at shear strength values from vane measurements, it is 
important to take into account rate effects, which increase with 
plasticity index (PI) (Bjerrum, 1972). Azzouz et al. (1983) 
suggested a correction factor that includes end effects, which 
would lead to an overestimate of shear strength if ignored. The 
undrained shear strength can then be obtained by multiplying 
the shear strength measured with the field vane by that 
correction factor. 
 












Fig. 11 Unit load versus settlement. 
 
 
For the bottom clay layer, a credible range for dsu/d'v was 
established based on the available CU test results, and this 
value optimized (resulting equal to 0.17) to best fit the vane 
test results. The natural water content, the density and the 
liquid and plastic limits were also obtained for various depths 
within each of the layers. The highest plasticity index 
observed for each clay layer was used to estimate the 
correction factor from Fig. 12, resulting in values of 0.75 for 
layer 1, 0.7 for layer 2 and 0.62 for layer 4. For the sand layer, 
only SPT results are available (Fig. 13 and Table 3). The 
ground water level was located at the depth of 1.90m. 
Although the borings extended down to a depth of 
approximately 20 meters, we know that, in this area of the 
country, glacial till is found at depths of approximately 30 
meters and sound rock at depths exceeding 60 meters. On that 
basis, in Fig. 13, we have extended the shear strength observed 
down to a depth of 30 meters, where glacial till then begins. 
The shear strength profile used in our analysis of this failure is 
indicated in Fig. 13 through straight line segments; it is given 
numerically in Table 4. 
 
Reassessment of the Case History using Modern Methods 
 
Previous attempts to analyze this case history relied on the 
bearing capacity equation (Nordlund and Deere 1970). 
Different forms of the bearing capacity equation are applicable 
to clay with su that is either constant or increases linearly with 
depth (Salgado 2008); the present soil profile cannot be fit into 
either of these cases. An additional deviation is the presence of 
the sand layer. Nordlund and Deere (1970), like Peck and 
Bryant (1953), used the Skempton (1951) bearing capacity 
equation. 
 
The friction angle for the sand layer was assumed as 25 
degrees, a value that is clearly too low based on present 
knowledge of sand behavior. The slip surface was assumed to 
reach down to a depth of 2B/3 below the base of the footing. 
The method of slices was used to evaluate the shear strength 
of the sand layer. A weighted average of the shear strength 
between the base of the footing and the depth of 2B/3 below 
the base was used to calculate the bearing capacity. Nordlund 
and Deere (1970) explored three methods of estimating shear 
strength: from unconfined compressive tests on untrimmed 
samples, from field vane tests and from field vane tests with 
correction for progressive failure. The calculated unit limit 
bearing capacities were 229kPa, 344 kPa and 281 kPa; 
respectively, 12% lower, 32% higher and 8% higher than the 
collapse load. This means that an attempt to estimate the load 
at collapse, even with the foreknowledge of the right answer, 
using the traditional bearing capacity equation would yield an 
uncertainty of about 44% (minus 12% to plus 32%) of the 
collapse load. The progressive failure correction relied on 
taking mobilized shear strengths at the same levels of strain as 
estimated from laboratory tests. Load eccentricity was ignored. 
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Fig. 12 Field vane correction factor (after Azzouz et al., 1983). 
 
We have again used limit analysis to bound the collapse load 
from below and above. Starting with plane-strain analysis, Fig. 
14 shows the mesh used in the analyses. Fig. 15 shows the soil 
mass distortion at collapse, and Fig. 16 shows the power 
dissipation throughout the soil mass. Both of these figures 
give an indication of the nature of the deformation associated 
with collapse. The lower bound limit unit bearing capacity 
ranged from 290 to 295 kPa as we varied the friction angle of 





Fig. 13 Shear Strength with depth (Boring No. 1, 2 and 3). 
 








Depth (m) Description Properties 
1 0-1.52 Silty clay 
 (kN/m3) 17.29 
(%) 30.5 
LL (%) 75 





  (kN/m3) 17.29 
wc (%) 43.2 
LL (%) 40-90 
PL (%) 30 
3 4.45-6.30 Loose sand 



















LL (%) 105-115 
PL (%) 37 
Sensitivity 4 
Note: wc = average water content;  = unit weight 
 






su or  
1 0-1.52 29.3-82.0 kPa (linear increase) 
2 1.52-4.45 57.7 kPa 
3 4.45-6.30  = 30-34o 
4 
6.30-7.70 42.8-71.7 kPa (linearly increase) 




















Fig. 14 Two-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the Fargo 
elevator. 
 
Fig. 17 shows the 3D mesh. Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 provide 
indications of the deformation field within the soil at collapse. 
The lower bound was calculated as 310 kPa, and the upper 
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bound as 378 kPa. As indicated earlier, the collapse load is 
expected to be much closer to the lower bound. This leaves 
our lower bound estimate about 15% higher than the estimated 









































Fig. 16 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the two-








Fig. 18 Distorted three-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for 




Fig. 19 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the three-
dimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Fargo elevator 
failure. 
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LEANING STABILITY 
 
The Tower of Pisa Case History 
 
The Tower of Pisa case history has been well covered in the 
literature. We follow here Salgado (2008) and provide only a 
summary of the essential facts needed for the focus of our 
discussion: the use of modern analysis methods to ascertain 
the controlling limit state for the Tower of Pisa. The 
discussion is largely based on work by Burland Potts (2003),  
 
The Tower of Pisa is located in the city of Pisa, in Tuscany, 
Italy. The city is located on the Arno River, northwest of 
Rome. The Tower stands 54m tall and weighs 142,000 kN.  
The foundation is a spread foundation in the form of a hollow 
cylinder with outer diameter equal to 19.58m and inner 
diameter equal to 4.47m (Mitchell et al 1977). The hollow 
space appears to have been filled with rubble and mortar at the 
time of construction (Burland et al. 2003). 
 
Construction of the Pisa Tower to its present height was done 
in several stages in the course of centuries.  The first stage 
extended from 1173 to 1178. No construction activity took 
place during the next century. Construction was restarted in 
1272, lasting until 1278. By 1272, it was evident that the 
Tower had started to lean, and masons attempted to correct for 
the leaning by placing stones on plumb (along a vertical 
alignment), not according to the Tower alignment.  Because of 
this, the Tower is curved, much like a banana.  Another 
century passed, and, in 1370, construction was completed after 
another decade of work.  It is estimated that the lean of the 
Tower at that time was 3.5 degrees, corresponding to an 
angular distortion equal to 0.061 or approximately 1/16. 
 
The tower is located on top of 300m of sediments deposited 
both by the Arno river and by the sea, at the time when the 
city was located in a coastal lagoon.  Focusing on the layers 
nearer to the ground surface, the Tower rests on about 9 
meters of dense river silts underlain by approximately 30 
meters of marine clay.  The foundations of the tower are 
shallow, approximately 20m in diameter and 3m in depth.  
Because the silt layer was more compressible on the south side 
of the Tower, the settlement developed faster there than on the 
north side, resulting in the Tower present inclination. 
 
It is interesting to note the reason why no bearing capacity 
failure ever occurred.  The century-long waiting periods 
between construction of the three stages of the Tower allowed 
the silts and clays to compress and strengthen (because denser 
soils are stronger), such that the soil was able to sustain the 
loads associated with subsequent construction.  By 1838, the 
Tower had settled in excess of 3 meters and the base of the 
tower had completely disappeared into the ground. An 
architect named Gherardesca did not like the fact that people 
could no longer see the base of the Tower and had a walkway 
excavated around the Tower.  This decision was certainly not 
a good idea from an engineering standpoint, as the removal of 
ground support only accelerated the Tower inclination.  By 
1911, the inclination had reached 5.4 degrees; by 1990, it was 
5.5 degrees, with no signs of stabilization. 
 
Altogether, there have been 17 commissions set up to assess 
the stability of the Tower of Pisa over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  The process was always quite political 
and usually resulted in no measures being implemented.  The 
17th commission was set up in 1990, with Professor Michele 
Jamiolkowski of the Technical University of Turin as the 
chair. Creation of the commission happened at a time when 
memories of the collapse of the Tower of Pavia, a city located 
just North of Milan, Italy, were fresh.  This was certainly 
helpful in overcoming political resistances that had been a 
problem for previous commissions. 
 
One of the first moves of the new commission was to reinforce 
the lowest story of the Tower using prestressed steel wires.  
This was done as long delays related to the politics 
surrounding the work of the commission were expected, and 
there was concern that the masonry composing the southern 
wall of the Tower was severely overstressed. In order to 
temporarily stabilize this rotation of the Tower, a post-
tensioned concrete ring was built around the base of the Tower 
and 6000kN of lead ingots stacked on it on the north side. The 
lead ingots did stabilize and even reverse the lean slightly. The 
lead ingots were not intended as a permanent solution, as the 
intent was always to reopen the Tower to visitation by tourists, 
and the ingots were considered a visually unattractive solution. 
We will return to this measure in the context of our limit state 
discussion later. The commission later decided to proceed with 
soil extraction from under the north side of the Tower as a 
definitive solution for its stabilization. 
 
In late 1996, pilot tests of the under-excavation technique 
were done.  The technique had been successfully used in the 
stabilization of the Mexico City Cathedral in the 1980's. The 
idea is simple (see Figure 2 22): to carefully and gradually 
remove soil from underneath the north side of the Tower so 
that it will settle, therefore reducing the lean.  However, there 
were members of the commission that had reservations about 
the technique.  A concern expressed by one member of the 
commission was that soil under-excavation might actually 
accelerate the leaning and even lead to collapse of the Tower 
by removing support (load-carrying capacity) from the Tower 
foundations and further stressing the already overloaded south 
side. A more natural expectation (subject to considerations 
discussed later), however, would be that careful, slow 
extraction of soil would allow overlying soil to move down to 
occupy the newly created space, moving the Tower down with 
it.  This is indeed what happened, for the tilt decreased sharply 
with the start of drilling at the end of 1999, extending 
throughout the year 2000, and finally stabilizing in 2001. The 
Tower now has the same inclination it had in 1800. 
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While in 1991 it was still believed that it would take tens of 
years for the Tower to reach a state of collapse, we now know 
that the geotechnical experts on the commission in charge of 
stabilizing the Tower came to believe in subsequent years that 
there were moments of grave danger of a collapse. In fact, 
according to Potts (2003), the Tower was likely dangerously 
close to collapse in the 1990-91 period. However, Mitchell 
(1977) argued that the factor of safety against bearing capacity 
failure appeared to be sufficient at all times of the Tower's 
existence (even if others have questioned by how much it 
exceeded one at certain times of the Tower's life).  So what 




Fig. 20 Tower with an initial lean of 0.5 degrees on top of a 
Tresca soil (clay) with undrained shear strength of 80 kPa 
(redrafted after Potts 2003). Used with permission from ICE 
Publishing. 
 
The beginnings of an answer lie in the Mitchell et al. (1977) 
observation that the maximum shear stress at points or within 
zones in the clay layer matched or exceed the estimated soil 
shear strength, even if the factor of safety was equal to 2.  This 
indicated that a plastic zone had likely formed below the south 
end of the Tower.  Potts (2003) provides a simple example 
that illustrates the type of collapse that the Tower of Pisa 
could have experienced. This type of collapse, known as 
leaning instability, is closely associated not only with the 
shear strength of the soil, which we use in our bearing 
capacity calculations, but also with the soil stiffness, as 
represented by its shear modulus. Fig. 20 shows a tower (with 
geometry quite similar to that of the Tower of Pisa) on top of a 
clay with su = 80kPa.  The tower is built with an initial 
inclination of 0.5˚. A finite element analysis then simulates the 
soil-tower response as the weight of the tower is gradually 
increased for three different values of soil stiffness: G = 10su, 
G = 100su, and G = 1000su.  Note that, since the value of su is 
the same in all three cases, the weight at which collapse would 
occur would be the same if bearing capacity were the 
mechanism of collapse.  Instead, as shown in 9, collapse takes 
place for a much lower tower weight in the case of low 





Fig. 21 Weight leading to collapse of the tower versus relative 
stiffness G/su of the foundation soil (redrafted after Potts 
2003). Used with permission from ICE Publishing. 
 
Fig. 22 shows a plot of incremental displacements at the last 
loading increment (just before collapse) for the case of low 
stiffness. It also shows that the shear stress in the soil becomes 
equal to the shear strength (forming a plastic zone, represented 
as a shaded zone) in only a portion of the soil deposit, and a 
plastic mechanism does not form.  So how does collapse 
occur?  In essence, it occurs through an overturning failure.  
The low stiffness of the soil as it enters the plastic range does 
not provide enough support beneath the right edge of the 
tower after a plastic zone forms there to balance the moment 
of the weight of the tower with respect to the center of the 
foundation.  Contrast that with the full plastic mechanism that 
forms below the tower in the high-stiffness-ratio case, shown 
in Fig. 23.  Here, clearly, we have a bearing capacity failure, 
which is a very different mechanism from leaning instability, 
hence the difference in tower weights for which these two 
failures are observed. 
 
Understanding the potential mechanism of instability for the 
Tower of Pisa was not merely an academic exercise.  For 
example, using lead ingots on the north side of the Tower to 
stabilize it, as described earlier, would only work, as argued 
by Potts (2003), if the prevailing mechanism was leaning 
instability, in which case the lean would reduce upon 
placement of the ingots.  If a bearing capacity failure had been 
in progress, the ingots would actually have precipitated 
failure. The same can be stated regarding underexcavation. 
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Fig. 22 Displacement field and plastic zone for soft (low-shear 
modulus) soil (redrafted after Potts 2003). Used with 




Fig. 23 Displacement field and plastic zone for stiff (high-
shear modulus) soil (redrafted after Potts 2003). Used with 






The practice of foundation design has relied extensively on 
empiricism and relatively simple analyses (such as the bearing 
capacity equation). This was needed because crucial elements 
in a rigorous analysis of soil mechanics problems were 
missing until very recently: computation power, rigorous 
methods for analyzing elasto-plastic boundary-value problems 
and realistic constitutive models. 
 
Our discipline is in a state of transition. The science of soil 
mechanics has developed considerably in the last 20-30 years. 
The progress in the science is gradually finding its way into 
practice, which still overwhelmingly relies on traditional 
methods. The evaluation of case histories using modern 
methods of analysis is a useful way to show the usefulness of 
these methods. In this paper, we have used finite-element limit 
analysis (FELA) and the finite element method (FEM) to 
reveal features of foundation engineering problems that would 
not otherwise be detectable with simple methods. We have 
done so without resorting to sophisticated constitutive models, 
relying instead on the well-known Tresca yield surface for 
clay in all three case histories and linear elasticity in the last of 
three case histories examined, but in more complex problems, 
certainly those involving frictional soils, more realistic soil 
models would be required. 
 
In the two cases in which a bearing capacity collapse was 
observed, we showed that use of the bearing capacity equation 
is awkward, requiring a number of assumption to make it 
applicable to the problems. For example, the bearing capacity 
equation does not accept soil layering (and, in fact, forms of it 
exist only for either uniform strength with depth or linear 
increasing strength with depth) and cannot mix sand and clay 
in the same soil deposit. In the last case history, we showed 
that use of the bearing capacity equation to assess the potential 
collapse of a tall, leaning structure would be completely 
incorrect if the ratio of soil strength to soil stiffness is high, 
which means only a more sophisticated method of analysis 
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